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Stimuli that resemble humans, but are not perfectly human-like, are disliked compared
to distinctly human and non-human stimuli. Accounts of this “Uncanny Valley” effect
often focus on how changes in human resemblance can evoke different emotional
responses. We present an alternate account based on the novel hypothesis that
the Uncanny Valley is not directly related to ‘human-likeness’ per se, but instead
reflects a more general form of stimulus devaluation that occurs when inhibition is
triggered to resolve conflict between competing stimulus-related representations. We
consider existing support for this inhibitory-devaluation hypothesis and further assess
its feasibility through tests of two corresponding predictions that arise from the link
between conflict-resolving inhibition and aversive response: (1) that the pronounced
disliking of Uncanny-type stimuli will occur for any image that strongly activates multiple
competing stimulus representations, even in the absence of any human-likeness, and
(2) that the negative peak of an ‘Uncanny Valley’ should occur at the point of greatest
stimulus-related conflict and not (in the presence of human-likeness) always closer to
the ‘human’ end of a perceptual continuum. We measured affective responses to a
set of line drawings representing non-human animal–animal morphs, in which each
continuum midpoint was a bistable image (Experiment 1), as well as to sets of human-
robot and human-animal computer-generated morphs (Experiment 2). Affective trends
depicting classic Uncanny Valley functions occurred for all continua, including the non-
human stimuli. Images at continua midpoints elicited significantly more negative affect
than images at endpoints, even when the continua included a human endpoint. This
illustrates the feasibility of the inhibitory-devaluation hypothesis and the need for further
research into the possibility that the strong dislike of Uncanny-type stimuli reflects the
negative affective consequences of cognitive inhibition.
Keywords: uncanny valley, cognitive conflict, inhibition, affect, emotion, inhibitory devaluation, visual perception,
cognitive dissonance
Introduction
The Uncanny Valley— a signiﬁcant decrease in liking for objects that closely resem-
ble humans but are not perfectly human-like— was originally described in terms of
the uncomfortable feeling associated with viewing robots of increasing human-likeness
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(Mori, 1970). Indeed, many accounts of this eﬀect have focused
on the potential relationship between the subjective human-
likeness of a stimulus and an observer’s emotional response to
it (e.g., MacDorman and Ishiguro, 2006; Seyama and Nagayama,
2007; MacDorman et al., 2009). The importance of elucidat-
ing speciﬁc mechanisms underlying the Uncanny Valley eﬀect
is underscored by the extent to which interest in this eﬀect
has spread from robotics into other areas, such as com-
puter graphics and prosthetics (Seyama and Nagayama, 2007;
MacDorman et al., 2009; Mitchell et al., 2011; Tinwell et al., 2011;
Poliakoﬀ et al., 2013). To this end, we consider here the novel
hypothesis that the Uncanny Valley is not directly related to
‘human-likeness’ per se, but instead reﬂects a more general form
of stimulus devaluation that occurs when inhibition is triggered
to resolve conﬂict between competing stimulus-related repre-
sentations. The purpose of this article is to therefore demon-
strate how the Uncanny Valley may be explained through recent
advances in our understanding of the negative aﬀective conse-
quences of cognitive inhibition. After presenting our ‘inhibitory-
devaluation’ hypothesis, we report a preliminary assessment of its
feasibility—in terms of prior ﬁndings as well as through two new
experiments that test speciﬁc predictions arising from this new
account of the Uncanny Valley—and then consider directions for
future research.
Inhibition, Negative Affect, and the Uncanny
Valley
A recent and growing body of research suggests that cognitive
inhibition is not only crucial for resolving potential interfer-
ence during visual tasks (i.e., when multiple stimulus/response
representations compete to become the focus of thoughts and
actions), but also subsequently results in negative aﬀect for
the associated stimuli (for reviews, see Fenske and Raymond,
2006; Raymond, 2009). Such aﬀectively negative consequences
of inhibition have been found in a variety of visual-recognition
tasks that require stimulus classiﬁcation (e.g., Kiss et al., 2008;
Frischen et al., 2012) and localization (e.g., Raymond et al., 2003;
Fenske et al., 2004), using stimuli ranging from meaningless
patterns (e.g., Raymond et al., 2003), non-human objects (e.g.,
Griﬃths and Mitchell, 2008), and entire scenes (Frischen et al.,
2012), to images of real human faces (Fenske et al., 2005),
and bodies (Ferrey et al., 2012). Moreover, these studies have
shown that this inhibitory devaluation impacts a variety of
subjective emotional judgments (i.e., likeability, relative prefer-
ence, cheerfulness, pleasantness, trustworthiness, sexual attrac-
tiveness), as well as the motivational incentive to seek and
obtain otherwise-appealing stimuli. Importantly, the magni-
tude of inhibitory devaluation increases with the level of
potential interference from competing stimulus-category or
stimulus-response representations (e.g., Raymond et al., 2005;
Frischen et al., 2012; Martiny-Huenger et al., 2013). This sug-
gests that the Uncanny Valley eﬀect could be a speciﬁc
instance of inhibition-related devaluation of stimuli whose
perception activates multiple, competing stimulus interpreta-
tions.
Most prior accounts of the Uncanny Valley eﬀect suggest it
occurs when humans view images of conspeciﬁcs (i.e., other
potential humans) that possess non-human traits. For instance,
one idea is that disliking of not-quite-humanlike images is
the result of a disgust response that evolved for the pur-
pose of pathogen avoidance (MacDorman and Ishiguro, 2006;
MacDorman et al., 2009). From this perspective, the stronger an
entity’s resemblance to a conspeciﬁc, the stronger the aversion
to a “deformed” version would be, since defects may cue poten-
tial disease, and conspeciﬁc resemblance cues the potential for
catching the disease due to genetic similarity (Rozin and Fallon,
1987). By extension, negative feelings elicited during studies
that have used human-like stimuli with mismatched features
(e.g., Seyama and Nagayama, 2007; MacDorman et al., 2009;
Mitchell et al., 2011) could reﬂect the activation of this human-
speciﬁc pathogen-avoidance mechanism.
In contrast to theories focusing on discrepancies related to
the ‘human-ness’ of stimuli, an inhibitory-devaluation account
of the Uncanny Valley predicts that negative evaluations will
be triggered by any stimulus that activates multiple, compet-
ing stimulus representations during recognition. Recent reviews
of the neurocognitive mechanisms underlying the perception
of ambiguous sensory information suggest that resolving such
competition, and the accompanying perceptual ambiguity, may
be achieved through mechanisms that suppress neural activ-
ity associated with perceptual features that conﬂict with the
perceptual outcome (e.g., Sterzer et al., 2009). This perspec-
tive is consistent with well-accepted biased-competition mod-
els of visual processing (e.g., Desimone and Duncan, 1995),
whereby each possible interpretation of an ambiguous ﬁgure
competes for representation across a hierarchical network of
visual areas. Top–down signals, such as those associated with
selective attention, can bias this neural competition in favor
of one perceptual interpretation over another (Meng and Tong,
2004). Evidence that inhibition of competing representations
may be one of the mechanisms through which the compe-
tition is biased to resolve such conﬂict (e.g., Munakata et al.,
2011) suggests that the well-established negative aﬀective con-
sequences of inhibition should be evident for any stimulus
that activates multiple, competing stimulus representations dur-
ing recognition, just as it is for stimuli associated with other
forms of inhibition (Fenske and Raymond, 2006; Raymond,
2009).
Support for a shift in focus from human-speciﬁc to more gen-
eral recognition-related mechanisms can also be seen in recent
‘categorization’ accounts of the Uncanny Valley (Cheetham et al.,
2011; Moore, 2012; Burleigh et al., 2013; Cheetham et al., 2013;
Burleigh and Schoenherr, 2015). These accounts generally con-
sider aﬀective response to be a function of stimulus distance
from a category boundary (Cheetham et al., 2011, 2014; but see
Burleigh and Schoenherr, 2015). A stimulus is easy to classify as
‘human’ or ‘non-human’ when it is far from the category bound-
ary along a ‘human’/‘non-human’ continuum. But a stimulus that
is at or near the category boundary is diﬃcult to classify because
its identity is ambiguous. Cheetham et al. (2011, 2014) provided
evidence of this category boundary at the midpoint of a human-
avatar morph continuum, and Burleigh et al. (2013) reported that
ambiguous morph-stimuli near the midpoint of a human–non-
human continuum were indeed associated with heightened levels
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 2 March 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 249
Ferrey et al. Uncanny valley as inhibitory devaluation
of negative aﬀect. The ﬁndings of Cheetham et al. (2014) further
support the idea that such devaluation may be linked to catego-
rization, but is not likely to follow from perceptual discrimination
diﬃculty, per se. Importantly, these previous results are consis-
tent with the possibility that stimuli near such midpoints strongly
activate multiple, competing visual-category representations dur-
ing recognition. From this perspective, negative aﬀect for such
items occurs to the extent that selecting one interpretation over
the other requires inhibition of the visual-category information
associated with the non-selected interpretation. The greater the
inhibition during identiﬁcation, the greater the negative aﬀect for
the associated stimulus.
A key feature of Uncanny Valley explanations that focus
on the ‘human-ness’ of stimuli concerns the expected loca-
tion of the ‘valley’ – the point along a perceptual continuum
where stimulus-related aﬀective response maximally deviates
from an otherwise linear function. A conspeciﬁc pathogen-
avoidance account, for example, predicts an asymmetrical val-
ley that drops closer to the ‘human’ side of a ‘human’/‘non-
human’ continuum. Indeed, this is exactly what was depicted
in Mori’s (1970) well-known original ﬁgure illustrating the
Uncanny Valley. In contrast, an inhibitory-devaluation account
predicts the greatest aﬀective drop at the point where multi-
ple competing visual-category representations are most strongly
activated. And while this should be at the midpoint for con-
tinua anchored by two equally distinct stimulus categories, the
exact location for any given continuum will vary depending on
parameters such as baseline aﬀective response to the speciﬁc
endpoints and the perceptual salience of the visual cues denot-
ing each category. This may explain why Seyama and Nagayama
(2007, Experiments 3), for example, were able to obtain a val-
ley location comparable to that depicted by Mori (1970), but
only after dramatically increasing the size (and thus the per-
ceptual salience) of the discrepant features in otherwise highly
human-like stimuli. Other studies utilizing ‘human’/‘nonhuman’
continua have found valleys at the midpoint, and occasionally
closer to the ‘non-human’ endpoint (MacDorman and Ishiguro,
2006; Burleigh et al., 2013). Such ﬁndings are consistent with
the possibility that the lowest point in the valley is not deter-
mined by the human-ness of the stimuli per se, but instead occurs
at whatever point requires the greatest inhibition of competing
visual-category information to select one stimulus interpretation
over another.
Inhibition has been proposed as a critical mechanism for
resolving conﬂict and potential interference from competing
signals in a variety of cognitive and neural operations (for
review, see Munakata et al., 2011). And while evidence of the link
between conﬂict-resolving inhibition and negative aﬀect has only
recently begun to accumulate, several lines of research, includ-
ing Burleigh et al.’s (2013) examination of the Uncanny Valley,
have demonstrated the link between situations involving cogni-
tive conﬂict and negative aﬀect. A classic example is cognitive
dissonance theory, which originally described how a negative
emotional response is elicited when a person’s attitude is at odds
with their behavior (Festinger, 1957). In more general terms,
cognitive dissonance describes a conﬂict between two incom-
patible cognitions (van Veen et al., 2009), which leads to both
autonomic arousal and negative aﬀect (Croyle and Cooper, 1983;
Losch and Cacioppo, 1990; Elliot and Devine, 1994) and has been
described as a state of discomfort and unease (Elliot and Devine,
1994). In order to resolve this conﬂict, cognitive resources must
be devoted to the problem. The corresponding negative aﬀect
may be linked in part to the extent that the resources recruited
in the face of such conﬂict include inhibition aimed at reducing
the salience of incompatible representations.
A special case of cognitive dissonance is post-decisional dis-
sonance. This phenomenon was ﬁrst observed in Brehm (1956),
who noticed that participants who were asked to choose between
two similarly valued items had rated selected items more posi-
tively than their initial ratings of the same item, and rated the
rejected itemmore negatively. In this case, a conﬂict between two
choices lead to negative aﬀect associated with the unchosen item.
This may result from recruitment of cortical areas that inhibit
representations of the unchosen option, leading to negative aﬀect
(Harmon-Jones, 2004).
Other types of interference or conﬂict are also associated with
negative aﬀect. For example, the interference that is caused by
response competition during the Stroop (1935) task when the
name of a color is presented in a color that is inconsistent with its
identity (e.g., the word “blue” in red ink). When conﬂict occurs,
the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC; Botvinick et al.,
2001; van Veen et al., 2009; Izuma et al., 2013) and insula regions
(van Veen et al., 2009) are activated, and individuals experi-
ence arousal and feelings of discomfort (Elliot and Devine, 1994;
van Veen et al., 2009), which motivates them to engage in a
dissonance-reduction strategy. In the case of a Stroop (1935) task,
for example, dissonance-reduction is accomplished by biasing
inputs such that word names or word colors dominate response
selection (Botvinick et al., 2001).
The consistency of prior ﬁndings with what we have recently
learned about the aﬀective consequences of inhibition suggests
that an inhibitory-devaluation account of the Uncanny Valley
eﬀect merits further consideration. One way to further assess its
feasibility is to begin experimentally testing speciﬁc predictions
that arise from our account. We report two such tests below
as a preliminary example of Uncanny Valley research into the
inhibitory-devaluation hypothesis.
Assessing the Feasibility of the
Inhibitory-Devaluation Hypothesis
The hypothesis that the Uncanny Valley reﬂects inhibitory deval-
uation of stimuli that activate multiple, competing stimulus inter-
pretations during recognition generates a number of testable
predictions. The two considered here concern the type of stim-
uli that can show Uncanny Valley eﬀects and the type of stimuli
that are likely to receive the most negative aﬀective evalua-
tions. Our experimental approach for assessing the potential
involvement of cognitive inhibition in the Uncanny Valley is the
same as that used extensively in studies of inhibitory devalu-
ation. In these prior studies, any type of stimulus—human or
non-human— appearing in experimental conditions suspected to
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involve cognitive inhibition have consistently received more neg-
ative evaluations than stimuli appearing in conditions thought
to be relatively free of inhibition (Fenske and Raymond, 2006;
Raymond, 2009). Such eﬀects are routinely obtained across sub-
stantially diﬀerent visual classiﬁcation and response-decision
tasks. Indeed, the link between inhibition and stimulus devalu-
ation is suﬃciently strong that researchers have begun to take the
occurrence of increasingly negative subjective stimulus evalua-
tions as a key indicator of the potential involvement of inhibition
at key points within a given task (e.g., Kihara et al., 2011). Thus,
while we do not directly measure inhibition per se, we instead
assess whether diﬀerences in aﬀective evaluations for items at
diﬀerent points along a given perceptual continuum are con-
sistent with the expected extent to which inhibition may be
applied during the perception of such items. The experiments
reported in this section therefore represent an important ﬁrst step
in assessing the feasibility of an inhibitory-devaluation account
by (1) conﬁrming that the Uncanny Valley also occurs when
humans view distinctly non-human stimuli, and (2) demonstrat-
ing that for human-like stimuli, the lowest point of the ‘valley’
does not always occur on the ‘human’ side of the perceptual
continuum.
The key emphasis on the human-ness of objects in prior
accounts of the Uncanny Valley eﬀect may explain why so lit-
tle work has been done to explore whether Uncanny Valley-type
eﬀects also occur with non-human stimuli. To the best of our
knowledge, the only published research of this sort currently
includes two papers by Yamada et al. (2012, 2013). However,
their ﬁndings do suggest that the Uncanny Valley can occur for
non-human stimuli. Yamada et al. (2012) obtained participants’
categorization responses and aﬀective ratings of images that mor-
phed between a tomato and a strawberry. The lowest likability
scores for these images coincided with the point of greatest ambi-
guity in stimulus categorization. Yamada et al. (2013) likewise
found that participants’ most aﬀectively negative ratings were
provided for the most ambiguous stimuli among sets of images
that morphed between a real dog and a cartoon dog, a real dog
and a stuﬀed-toy dog, and a cartoon dog and a stuﬀed-toy dog.
Unfortunately, the veracity of these ﬁndings remains unclear
because of issues associated with the use of relatively small
sample sizes (e.g., Yamada et al., 2013, utilized 12 or fewer partic-
ipants in each experiment), and the possibility that their stimuli
included visual artifacts produced by the morphing process that
may have had a confounding inﬂuence on participants’ aﬀective
ratings.
Our studies therefore expand upon these important prior
ﬁndings to provide a converging test of the prediction that
Uncanny Valley eﬀects should not be limited to the perception
of humans, but should also occur with non-human stimuli. Thus,
in Experiment 1, we use bistable line drawings of animals, a type
of non-human stimuli that has been speciﬁcally designed to acti-
vate multiple, competing stimulus interpretations (Fisher, 1967).
The sets of line-drawn images we used were speciﬁcally chosen
for their step-wise diﬀerences along a given two-category contin-
uum and because of the availability of normative data regarding
the corresponding level of perceptual ambiguity of each item
(Verstijnen and Wagemans, 2004).
Accordingly, the conditions in Experiment 1 in which we sus-
pect the greatest involvement of inhibition during perception
concern those items whose perceptual features are consistent with
multiple conﬂicting interpretations, such as those near the mid-
point of a given continuum. In contrast, recognition of items
closer to a continuum endpoint, whose perceptual features are
clearly consistent with a single interpretation, should be rela-
tively free of inhibition. Following the experimental approach of
prior inhibitory devaluation studies, we therefore expect that any
stimulus occurring near themidpoint of such a two-category con-
tinuum should receive more negative evaluations than items near
the continuum endpoints. Participants in our studies were asked
to evaluate stimuli based on their initial emotional reaction to
each stimulus using a numerical rating scale. This allowed us to
obtain an accurate measure of subjective emotional reactions to
non-human stimuli that vary in the extent to which they activate
multiple, competing stimulus interpretations.
In addition to responses to non-human stimuli, we also pre-
dicted that when assessing aﬀective responses to human-like
stimuli, the location of the ‘valley’— the point along a perceptual
continuum where stimulus-related aﬀective response maximally
deviates from an otherwise linear function — should occur near
the midpoint of a two-category continuum. We tested this pre-
diction in Experiment 2 by examining diﬀerences in individuals’
aﬀective responses to sets of 3D computer-modeled images that
represent diﬀerent points along human-to-robot and human-to-
animal morphed continua.
Experiment 1: Non-Human Bistable Images
Materials and Methods
Stimuli in this experiment consisted of three diﬀerent sets of
line drawings, each comprising a step-wise continuum of dif-
ferences in perceptual similarity to two distinct animals. The
stimulus at the midpoint of each continuum is a bistable image
that can be interpreted as either of the two animals (see Figure 1
for example). Bistable images have long been of interest (e.g.,
Fisher, 1967) as stimuli that can support two incompatible inter-
pretations, although the stimulus itself does not change. Such
stimuli are speciﬁcally created to ensure maximal category con-
ﬂict for items near the bistable midpoint. Normative stimulus-
classiﬁcation data provided by Verstijnen andWagemans (2004)
previously established that the point of maximal perceptual ambi-
guity for these stimulus sets was for the item within one step
FIGURE 1 | Bistable image examples (rabbit-duck, rhino-giraffe, and
duck-elephant; originally from Hogeboom (1995), as cited in
Verstijnen and Wagemans (2004).
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 4 March 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 249
Ferrey et al. Uncanny valley as inhibitory devaluation
of the midpoint (i.e., midpoint plus or minus one step) of each
continuum.
We predicted that the shape of the aﬀective data for stim-
uli from each continuum would be consistent with an Uncanny
Valley function (i.e., non-linear). Following Burleigh et al. (2013),
we tested this by ﬁtting linear, cubic, and quadratic functions to
the data for each continuum. Because the Uncanny Valley func-
tion (Mori, 1970) is essentially a cubic function, we expected a
cubic or quadratic function would ﬁt our data better than a linear
function. We also predicted that the speciﬁc shape of this non-
linear function would be formed by lower aﬀective ratings for
morph-stimuli near the midpoint of the continua than for those
near the endpoints.
All of the following materials and procedures were approved
by the Research Ethics Board at the University of Guelph (REB
#11NV011).
Participants
Sixty undergraduate students (31 women, Mage = 20 years,
SDage = 3.6) participated in exchange for course credit. The only
inclusion criterion was having normal or corrected-to-normal
vision.
Apparatus and stimuli
Stimuli consisted of three sets line drawings, each com-
prising seven images (Hogeboom, 1995, as cited in
Verstijnen and Wagemans, 2004). Sets included: duck-elephant,
rhino-giraﬀe, and rabbit-duck (see Figure 1).
The 21 images were presented in a randomized order for each
participant using an Intel Core2Duo computer with a 50.8 cm
LCDmonitor (resolution: 1680× 1050 pixels) running PsychoPy
software (Peirce, 2007). Displays were viewed at a distance of
75 cm in a sound-attenuated room, with low ambient illumina-
tion. Stimuli were presented one at a time at the center of the
screen for 400 ms along with a visual-analog rating scale that
ranged from “dislike verymuch” (0.00) to “like very much” (1.00).
Participants were required to use the mouse to select the point on
the line that best matched their emotional response to each stim-
ulus. The rating scale had a precision of 0.01 unit increments, and
was visible on the screen until a response was registered.
Results
Average ratings were calculated for each stimulus as a function of
its location along its corresponding continuum. These are plotted
separately for each stimulus set in Figure 2, along with average
ratings calculated across the three stimulus sets.
We predicted that the shape of the aﬀective data for stim-
uli from each continuum would be consistent with an Uncanny
Valley function (i.e., non-linear). To assess this, we ﬁt linear,
cubic, and quadratic functions to the data for each continuum,
as in Burleigh et al. (2013). Because the Uncanny Valley func-
tion (Mori, 1970) is essentially a cubic function, it follows that
FIGURE 2 | Affective trends for animal-animal bistable morphs in Experiment 1.
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if a cubic or quadratic function was found to ﬁt the data bet-
ter than a linear function, then this would support an Uncanny
Valley interpretation.
We used the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC; see
Burnham and Anderson, 2002) as our goodness-of-ﬁt index. The
AIC is suited to comparing models with diﬀerent degrees of
complexity because it penalizes models with additional ﬁt param-
eters. We calculated raw Akaike values and Akaike Weights
(wi), which are a transformation of raw scores that indicate the
probability that a particular model among the set of models is
correct (Wagenmakers and Farrell, 2004). Using these weights,
we also calculated evidence ratios by dividing the weight of
one model by the weight of another. These ratios are under-
stood in context of a “conﬁdence set,” which is similar to
a conﬁdence interval and is deﬁned as 10% of the highest
Akaike Weight in the set (Royall, 1997). For the purposes of
interpretation, it should be noted that lower raw Akaike val-
ues and higher Akaike Weights indicate a better ﬁt to the
data.
As indicated by the evidence ratios in Table 1, our curve-ﬁt
analyses conﬁrmed that non-linear quadratic and cubic models
were best ﬁt to the data, whereas linear models fell outside the
conﬁdence set. To the extent that such non-linear functions are
a deﬁning feature of the Uncanny Valley (Burleigh et al., 2013),
this ﬁnding is consistent with the possibility that Uncanny Valley
eﬀects can occur with distinctly non-human stimuli.
Indeed, we predicted that the speciﬁc shape of this non-
linear function for bistable images would further resemble an
Uncanny Valley by having lower aﬀective ratings for morph-
stimuli near the midpoint of the continua than for those near the
endpoints. The average rating for stimuli at positions 1 and 7—
the unambiguous category endpoints—was therefore compared
to the average rating for the position-4 midpoint stimulus for
each stimulus set using paired-samples t-tests. Consistent with
our expectations, endpoint items were rated more positively than
midpoint items from the duck-elephant [endpoints, M = 0.65,
SD = 0.17; midpoint, M = 0.58, SD = 0.22; t(59) = 2.86,
p = 0.006], rabbit-duck [endpoints, M = 0.66, SD = 0.16;
midpoint, M = 0.56, SD = 0.22; t(59) = 4.64, p < 0.001],
and rhino-giraﬀe [endpoints, M = 0.54, SD = 0.17; midpoint,
M = 0.45, SD= 0.18; t(59)= 3.80, p< 0.001] sets.
Our results based on average ratings suggest that participants
provided their lowest aﬀective ratings to morph-stimuli at inter-
mediate positions of each continuum rather than to those at
either continuum endpoint. To examine the extent to which this
pattern was observable at the level of individual participants, we
plotted an abbreviated rating function for each participant’s aﬀec-
tive response to each perceptual continuum. This was comprised
of each participant’s rating of the stimulus at each endpoint (i.e.,
positions 1 and 7) along with the lowest rating they provided to
an intermediate stimulus (i.e., among positions 2–6). As shown
in Figure 3A, for each perceptual continuum, the vast majority of
participants (85% for duck-elephant, 87% for duck-rabbit, 80%
for rhino-giraﬀe) provided their most negative aﬀective rating in
response to an intermediate stimulus. The resulting ‘valley’ shape
of these individuals’ rating functions is visually evident despite
substantial variability otherwise in their individual responses.
However, it is also the case that, for each perceptual contin-
uum, a corresponding minority of participants provided their
lowest rating for an endpoint stimulus, failing to show a val-
ley shape in their individual rating functions (see Figure 3B).
This suggests that while most individuals’ aﬀective responses
were appropriately reﬂected by our group averages, others do
not show the same Uncanny-valley-type pattern of responses (see
MacDorman and Entezari, 2015, for another example of individ-
ual diﬀerences in Uncanny Valley eﬀects).
Taken together, the results of Experiment 1 replicate and
expand upon the important preliminary ﬁndings of Yamada et al.
(2012, 2013) to conﬁrm that Uncanny Valley-type eﬀects can
occur with distinctly non-human stimuli. These ﬁndings are
therefore consistent with the possibility that the drop in aﬀective
response reﬂected by the Uncanny Valley may not be determined
by the human-ness of the stimuli per se, butmight instead occur at
whatever point requires greatest inhibition of competing visual-
category information to select one stimulus interpretation over
another.
Experiment 2: 3D Computer Models
Materials and Methods
The possibility that the Uncanny Valley reﬂects inhibitory deval-
uation of stimuli that activate multiple, competing stimulus inter-
pretations during recognition suggests that the location of the
TABLE 1 | Experiment 1 curve fit analyses.
Set Model Residual sum
of squares
AICc i(AIC) wi(AIC) CI
Duck-elephant* Linear1 20.31 −1270.26 7.66 0.02 0.07
Quadratic2 19.85 −1277.92 0.00 0.71 –
Cubic3 19.84 −1276.03 −1.89 0.28 –
Rabbit-duck* Linear 19.92 −1278.45 7.62 0.01 0.07
Quadratic 19.47 −1286.07 0.00 0.65 –
Cubic 19.44 −1284.71 1.35 0.33 –
Rhino-giraffe* Linear 20.76 −1261.06 12.91 0.00 0.07
Quadratic 20.10 −1272.67 1.29 0.34 –
Cubic 19.94 −1273.96 0.00 0.66 –
1K = 1, 2K = 2, 3K = 3, *n = 420.
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FIGURE 3 | Individual participants’ affective response to each
animal–animal bistable morph continua in Experiment 1.
Abbreviated rating functions are each comprised of a specific
participant’s rating of the stimulus at each endpoint (i.e., positions 1
and 7) along with the lowest rating they provided to an intermediate
stimulus (i.e., among positions 2–6). The majority of participants
(A) provided their lowest affective rating to a stimulus from an
intermediate position. The resulting ‘valley’ shape of these individual
rating functions is consistent with the Uncanny Valley-type effects
identified in the group-average results, but is absent in a minority of
participants (B) who each provided their lowest rating to at least one
of the continua-endpoint items.
valley—the continuum point showing the most aﬀectively neg-
ative stimulus response— should occur at the point where multi-
ple competing visual-category representations are most strongly
activated. Thus, in contrast to explanations that focus on the
‘human-ness’ of stimuli, this lowest point for human-like stim-
uli should not always occur on the ‘human’ side of the perceptual
continuum.
To test this prediction, we measured aﬀective responses to
a series of 3D computer-modeled morph stimuli representing
diﬀerent locations along diﬀerent human-non-human continua.
To replicate the classic Uncanny Valley eﬀect, one stimulus set
was created from human-robot morphs. Additional stimulus
sets were created from various human–animal continua. For all
stimulus sets, we expected stimuli near continua midpoints to
receive more negative aﬀective ratings than those depicting cat-
egory endpoints. Furthermore, we predicted that the greatest
drop in aﬀective ratings would not consistently occur at stimulus-
continuum locations near the “human” endpoint, as predicted by
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a conspeciﬁc pathogen-avoidance account of the Uncanny Valley
eﬀect.
All of the following materials and procedures were approved
by the Research Ethics Board at the University of Guelph (REB
#11NV011).
Participants
Sixty-nine undergraduate students (54 women, Mage = 19 years,
SDage = 1.2) participated in exchange for course credit. The only
inclusion criterion was having normal or corrected-to-normal
vision. None of the participants in Experiment 2 had previously
participated in Experiment 1.
Apparatus and stimuli
Stimuli consisted of 35 computer-generated images that were
created using Poser (Version 2012, www.smithmicro.com)
modeling software and Abrosoft FantaMorph (Version 5.4,
www.fantamorph.com) morphing software. In all, there was one
human-robot morph-continuum, and four human-animal con-
tinua (human-stag, human-tiger, human-lion, and human-bird),
each with seven continuum levels – see Figure 4.
In order to create the human-animal stimuli, a “base”
human model, Michael 4, was obtained from daz3d.com, and
modiﬁed using commercial morph packages for Poser (speciﬁ-
cally, the Leonese and Cervus characters obtained from philoso-
phersegg.com, and the Bird Cult character obtained from
daz3d.com). Each of these morph packages comprise a pre-
deﬁned set of morphological transformations that can be applied
to a base model in order to holistically transform its morphology
into the animal character. These packages also contain textures
that transform the “skin” of the character into the fur of the
animal. A crucial aspect of thesemorph packages is that the trans-
formations can be applied in a continuous fashion, by assigning
values between 0.000 and 1.000 (e.g., a transformation value of
0.500 would be morphologically half-human and half-animal).
Similarly, textures can be applied in a continuous fashion, by
applying both the human and animal textures to the same ﬁg-
ure, and setting them to diﬀerent levels of opacity (e.g., a 50%
opacity overlay would produce a texture that is half-human and
half-animal). In order to generate the human-animal morph
stimuli, we therefore usedmorphological transformation and tex-
ture opacity values in Poser to create stepwise morphs from one
model to another. Thesemorphs represented the following ratios:
0-animal/100-human, 15/85, 30/70, 50/50, 70/30, 85/15, 100/0. In
order to create the human-robot morph stimuli, a slightly diﬀer-
ent approach was taken. Speciﬁcally, we used rendered images of
Poser models (i.e., the same human model as before, and KlanK
from daz3d.com), and entered these into FantaMorph software
to create a morph sequence. This change was necessary because
we were unable to ﬁnd a suitable robot morph package for Poser
that was compatible with the human ﬁgure. The human-robot
morph stimuli were generated to represent the same ratios as
the human-animal stimuli. All stimuli were cropped and saved
as JPEG images at a resolution of 912× 805 pixels.
A pilot study was conducted to ensure that subjective percep-
tions of the resulting stimuli were consistent with their objective
location on the corresponding continuum. In this pilot study,
seven participants rated the 35 stimuli, which were presented in
randomized order in a single block, on a 7-point Likert scale
FIGURE 4 | Computer-generated morphs (human-robot, human-stag, human-tiger, human-lion, human-bird).
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ranging from “human-like” to “animal-like” or from “human-
like” to “robot-like.” Results indicated that the point of maximal
perceptual ambiguity for these stimulus sets was the item within
one step of the midpoint (i.e., midpoint plus or minus one
step) of each continuum. Response averages indicated that these
items were explicitly rated as equally belonging to each of the
two categories. Our analyses also revealed that each step in the
continuum was perceived as a linear change in the category
membership of the model, resulting in overall linear trends for
categorical-similarity ratings across eachmorph continuum. This
also ensured that the stimulus at the midpoint of each continuum
clearly contained visual-category information from both end-
point categories. None of the participants from this pilot-study
were utilized in the subsequent aﬀective-rating task.
The testing apparatus and procedures for the aﬀective-rating
task were exactly the same as used in Experiment 1, with the
exception that participants provided aﬀective ratings for a total
of 35 individual stimuli (ﬁve sets of sevenmorphs) in Experiment
2 compared to 21 stimuli in Experiment 1 (three sets of seven
drawings).
Results
Average ratings were calculated for each stimulus as a function of
its location along its corresponding continuum. These are plotted
separately for each stimulus set in Figure 5, along with average
ratings calculated across the ﬁve stimulus sets.
As a formal test for the existence of an Uncanny Valley func-
tion, we again used curve ﬁtting analyses. Raw Akaike values,
Akaike Weights, and conﬁdence sets were calculated in order to
compare the ﬁt of linear, quadratic, and cubic models.
As indicated by the evidence ratios in Table 2, our curve-ﬁt
analyses conﬁrmed that non-linear quadratic and cubic models
were best ﬁt to the data, whereas linear models fell outside the
conﬁdence set. To the extent that such non-linear functions are
a deﬁning feature of the Uncanny Valley (Burleigh et al., 2013),
this ﬁnding is indicative of an Uncanny Valley, not only for the
human-robot morph continua, but also for each of the human–
animal continua.
While the ability to demonstrate an Uncanny Valley for vari-
ous sets of stimuli is an important manipulation check, our key
prediction in Experiment 2 concerned the continuum-location
FIGURE 5 | Affective trends for human-robot and human-animal morphs in Experiment 2.
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for each stimulus set that received the most negative aﬀective
ratings. As shown in Figure 5, this valley low-point was located
at position 4—the continua midpoint— for each of the human-
robot and human-animal stimulus sets (human-robot:M = 0.26,
SD = 0.22; human-stag: M = 0.33, SD = 0.17; human-tiger:
M = 0.41, SD= 0.22, human-lion:M = 0.37, SD= 0.21; human-
bird: M = 0.25, SD = 0.20). Moreover, paired-samples t-tests
revealed that average ratings for items near these continua mid-
points were indeed signiﬁcantly lower than those for endpoint
items for both the human-robot stimuli (endpoints, M = 0.54,
SD = 0.17; midpoint, M = 0.26, SD = 0.22; t(68) = 12.95,
p< 0.001) and the human–animal stimuli [endpoints,M = 0.52,
SD = 0.16; midpoint, M = 0.34, SD = 0.24; t(68) = 9.83,
p< 0.001].
As in Experiment 1, we plotted an abbreviated rating function
for each participant’s aﬀective response to each perceptual con-
tinuum comprised of their rating of each endpoint stimulus along
with their lowest rating to an intermediate stimulus. As shown in
Figure 6A, for each continuum, the majority of participants (79%
for human-bird, 76% for human-stag, 76% for human-lion, 72%
for human-tiger, and 79% for human-robot) provided their most
negative aﬀective rating in response to an intermediate stimulus.
The resulting ‘valley’ shape of these individuals’ rating functions
is visually evident for each continuum. However, a corresponding
minority of participants again provided their lowest rating for an
endpoint stimulus, failing to show a valley shape in their individ-
ual rating functions (see Figure 6B). Indeed, certain participants
consistently failed to show Uncanny Valley eﬀects for most (e.g.,
Participant 4) or all (e.g., Participant 11) morph continua.
Taken together, the results of Experiment 2 replicate previ-
ous ﬁndings (e.g., Burleigh et al., 2013) and are consistent with
the possibility that the aﬀective low-points in Uncanny Valley
functions are not determined by the human-ness of the stimuli
per se, but instead by the amount of conﬂicting stimulus infor-
mation during recognition and the need to inhibit competing
visual-category information to select one stimulus interpretation
over another.
Assessing Feasibility: Discussion
The data reported above were collected as a ﬁrst step in exper-
imentally assessing the feasibility of the hypothesis that the
Uncanny Valley reﬂects a form of inhibitory stimulus deval-
uation. For a perceptual continuum where the endpoints are
comprised of two separate categories, this account predicts that
maximum negative aﬀect occurs where there is greatest activation
of multiple, competing stimulus representations. We conducted
two experiments to test the corresponding predictions (1) that the
Uncanny Valley also occurs when humans view distinctly non-
human stimuli, and (2) that the lowest point of the ‘valley’ does
not always occur on the ‘human’ side of the perceptual contin-
uum. In Experiment 1, we used distinctly non-human stimuli:
bistable line drawings of animals, a type of stimulus that activates
multiple, competing stimulus interpretations. We found that
aﬀective ratings of these bistable continua were best ﬁt by non-
linear models, which is consistent with an Uncanny Valley inter-
pretation, and that stimuli near the midpoint were rated as least
likeable. In Experiment 2, we generated 3D computer-modeled
images that comprised human-to-robot and human-to-animal
morphed continua. We found that aﬀective ratings of these
human-non-human morph continua were best ﬁt by non-linear
models, and that stimuli near the midpoint were rated as least
likeable. Importantly, we observed that aﬀective minima—the
stimulus with the lowest aﬀect rating in each stimulus set—
were not always on the ‘human’ side of the human-non-human
continua. Taken together, these results are consistent with a gen-
eral recognition-related account based on the novel hypothesis
that the Uncanny Valley is a speciﬁc instance of a more gen-
eral form of stimulus devaluation that occurs when inhibition is
triggered to resolve conﬂict between competing stimulus-related
representations.
TABLE 2 | Experiment 2 curve fit analyses.
Set Model Residual sum
of squares
AICc i(AIC) wi(AIC) CI
Human-robot* Linear1 32.69 −1298.74 93.34 0.00 0.09
Quadratic2 27.13 −1386.78 5.29 0.07 –
Cubic3 26.72 −1392.07 0.00 0.93 –
Human-stag* Linear 23.73 −1453.33 46.15 0.00 0.05
Quadratic 21.48 −1499.48 0.00 0.47 –
Cubic 21.38 −1499.74 −0.26 0.53 –
Human-tiger* Linear 25.78 −1413.40 22.25 0.00 0.03
Quadratic 24.52 −1435.65 0.00 0.70 –
Cubic 24.50 −1433.94 1.71 0.30 –
Human-lion* Linear 26.66 −1452.02 42.92 0.00 0.10
Quadratic 24.86 −1484.60 10.34 0.01 –
Cubic 24.25 −1494.94 0.00 0.99 –
Human-bird* Linear 24.82 −1431.75 67.46 0.00 0.07
Quadratic 21.58 −1497.26 1.95 0.27 –
Cubic 21.41 −1499.21 0.00 0.73 –
1K = 1, 2K = 2, 3K = 3, *n = 483.
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FIGURE 6 | Individual participants’ affective response to each
human-robot and human-animal morph continua in Experiment 2.
Abbreviated rating functions are each comprised of a specific
participant’s rating of the stimulus at each endpoint (i.e., positions 1
and 7) along with the lowest rating they provided to an intermediate
stimulus (i.e., among positions 2–6). The majority of participants
(A) provided their lowest affective rating to a stimulus from an
intermediate position. The resulting ‘valley’ shape of these individual
rating functions is consistent with the Uncanny Valley-type effects
identified in the group-average results, but is absent in a minority of
participants (B) who each provided their lowest rating to at least one
of the continua-endpoint items.
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Mori’s (1970) original hypothesis suggested that near-perfect
human-likeness was key to the Uncanny Valley eﬀect, and
theoretical accounts such as the pathogen avoidance hypoth-
esis (e.g., MacDorman et al., 2009) were consistent with this
premise. These accounts make two basic predictions: the ﬁrst
is that the Uncanny Valley eﬀect should only occur when indi-
viduals view stimuli that portray conspeciﬁcs (e.g., humans
viewing humans), and the second is that the location of the
‘valley’ should be on the ‘human’ side of a ‘human’/‘non-
human’ continuum. Our results are consistent with a diﬀer-
ent interpretation. We found an Uncanny Valley eﬀect with
distinctly non-human stimuli. Moreover, when using human-
like morph stimuli, the location of the ‘valley’ was not con-
sistently on the ‘human’ side of the continuum. We suggest
instead that the Uncanny Valley may reﬂect the aﬀective con-
sequences of cognitive processes applied to stimuli whose per-
ception strongly activates multiple, competing stimulus repre-
sentations. This perspective is based on a well-established and
growing body of evidence that cognitive inhibition—known
for its role in resolving potential interference during visual
tasks—has distinctly negative aﬀective consequences for associ-
ated stimuli (Fenske and Raymond, 2006; Frischen et al., 2012).
Negative aﬀect for stimuli within an Uncanny Valley context may
therefore occur to the extent that selecting one stimulus inter-
pretation over the other requires inhibition of visual-category
information associated with the non-selected interpretation. The
greater the inhibition during identiﬁcation, the greater the neg-
ative aﬀect for the associated stimulus. Importantly, our results
here suggest that such stimulus devaluation characteristic of the
Uncanny Valley does not depend on the human-ness of the
stimuli per se.
Outstanding Issues and Future
Directions
Our consideration of prior Uncanny Valley ﬁndings and recent
advances in our understanding of the aﬀective consequences
of cognitive inhibition have led to the hypothesis that aﬀec-
tive devaluation by stimulus-related inhibition may underlie the
Uncanny Valley eﬀect. The consistency of the results of our
preliminary experimental tests of key predictions arising from
this new account further establish its feasibility. However, some
outstanding issues need to be addressed before the value of
inhibitory devaluation can be fully realized as an explanatory
construct in Uncanny Valley research.
Negative Affect from Inhibition or
Reduced Fluency?
Yamada et al. (2012, 2013) have suggested that the Uncanny
Valley eﬀect may be due to low processing ﬂuency (i.e., the
ease with which stimulus-information is processed) for items
that are diﬃcult to categorize (e.g., as human or non-human).
This account relies on the well-established connection between
increases in processing ﬂuency and the experience of positive
aﬀect toward associated stimuli (see Reber et al., 2004 for review).
There are some reasons, however, to suspect that the distinctly
negative responses associated with the Uncanny Valley may be
linked to cognitive inhibition rather than ﬂuctuations in ﬂu-
ency, per se. First, it is conceivable that a stimulus-processing
episode involving inhibition might reduce ﬂuency and the pos-
itive aﬀect associated with the item—in which case, process-
ing ﬂuency would be a proxy for cognitive inhibition. Second,
the aﬀective consequences of ﬂuency are thought to be dis-
tinctively positive (Reber et al., 1998; Winkielman and Cacioppo,
2001). Furthermore, experimental conditions that typically favor
increased perceptual ﬂuency (i.e., repeated and longer-duration
stimulus exposures, and stimulus presentations at central foveal
locations associated with high visual acuity) nevertheless lead to
distinctly negative aﬀective stimulus ratings whenever successful
task performance requires attentional or response-related inhi-
bition (Fenske et al., 2004; Raymond et al., 2005; Frischen et al.,
2012). Thus, the available evidence to date points to a clearer
link between inhibition and aversive stimulus response than
between changes in ﬂuency and stimulus-related negative
aﬀect.
The Challenge of Indirect Measures of
Inhibition
We conducted two experiments to assess the feasibility of the
hypothesis that the Uncanny Valley reﬂects the negative aﬀec-
tive consequences of cognitive inhibition, yet neither experiment
included a measure of inhibition, per se. And while the link
between inhibition and stimulus devaluation is suﬃciently strong
that researchers have begun to take the occurrence of increas-
ingly negative subjective stimulus evaluations as a key indicator
of the potential involvement of inhibition at key points within
a given task (e.g., Kihara et al., 2011), there are certainly many
other factors that can lead to an aversive response. Thus, one
of the outstanding challenges for further assessing the feasibility
of the inhibitory-devaluation hypothesis is to obtain converg-
ing evidence that competition between the multiple stimulus-
category representations activated by Uncanny-type stimuli is
indeed resolved through inhibition of the non-selected repre-
sentations. Part of the challenge arises from the fact that tradi-
tional cognitive-behavioral measures of inhibition (e.g., percep-
tual response time and accuracy) are also indirect measures—
indices of inhibitory aftereﬀects rather than a metric of inhibi-
tion itself. These traditional measures, as well subjective aﬀec-
tive ratings, can therefore be inﬂuenced by other factors that
may systematically accompany inhibition, such as cognitive con-
ﬂict. Nevertheless, the absence of a direct behavioral measure
of inhibition has not precluded the usefulness of using indi-
rect measures in exploring its potential involvement in a wide
variety of cognitive faculties (for review, see Bari and Robbins,
2013). Advances in combining cognitive methods with neu-
roimaging techniques can also provide a converging-methods
approach that may be critical for disentangling the speciﬁc cog-
nitive and aﬀective sequence of events involved in inhibitory
devaluation and the extent to which they contribute to the
Uncanny Valley eﬀect. We outline some of these possibilities
below.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 12 March 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 249
Ferrey et al. Uncanny valley as inhibitory devaluation
Neurocognitive Mechanisms
If the Uncanny Valley eﬀect reﬂects inhibitory devaluation of
stimuli that activate multiple, competing interpretations during
recognition, then neuroimaging investigations of the Uncanny
Valley should be expected to show critical similarities with neu-
roimaging investigations of inhibitory devaluation. So far, the
only examinations of the neural correlates of inhibitory devalu-
ation include a pair of electrophysiological (event-related poten-
tial) studies by Kiss et al. (2007, 2008), and a functional mag-
netic resonance imaging (fMRI) study by Doallo et al. (2012).
Nevertheless, each of these studies have indicated that the mag-
nitude of neural activation associated with resolving potential
interference among competing stimulus/motor-response repre-
sentations are linked to subsequent levels of negative subjective
evaluations of the associated stimuli.
Doallo et al. (2012), for example, found that the level of activ-
ity in lateral prefrontal cortex (middle frontal gyrus) was greatest
during periods requiring response inhibition for successful task
performance. The level of activity in this inhibition-related region
was linked to the subsequent magnitude of aﬀective devalua-
tion in participants’ subjective ratings of the stimuli. Within
the realm of Uncanny Valley eﬀects, Saygin et al. (2012) like-
wise observed a greater change in activity within a region of
middle frontal gyrus (among other lateral areas of the parietal
and temporal cortices) when participants repeatedly observed a
robot with human features (i.e., a stimulus depicting multiple,
competing categories) than when participants repeatedly viewed
a robot without human features or a real human (i.e., stimuli
that depicted a single object category). It should be noted, how-
ever, that Saygin et al. (2012) did not measure aﬀective responses
to their stimuli. Nevertheless, some broadly consistent ﬁnd-
ings across paradigms have also been obtained in fronto-limbic
areas thought to be involved in the coding of items’ motiva-
tional or emotional signiﬁcance. Doallo et al. (2012), for example,
reported that the level of activity in orbital-frontal cortex, insu-
lar cortex, and amygdala during periods of motor-inhibition
was linked to the subsequent magnitude of stimulus devalua-
tion. Cheetham et al. (2011) likewise observed relative increases
in activity within amygdala and insular cortex when a morph
image bearing a greater resemblance to an inanimate human-
like avatar was quickly followed by a diﬀerent image depicting a
real human than when followed by another avatar. Their ﬁndings
support the idea that conditions that evoke multiple, compet-
ing stimulus representations can elicit activity in emotion-related
areas, even in the absence of motor-related conﬂict or cate-
gorical ambiguity, per se. Unfortunately, their passive-viewing
approach meant that participants in their study were not asked
to provide any explicit perceptual or (even more importantly
here) aﬀective judgments about the stimuli they viewed, mak-
ing it impossible to link the changes in neural activity they
observed to subjective perceptual or aﬀective outcomes. And
while comparisons are otherwise limited by the many diﬀer-
ences in methods and procedures, the consistency in the results
of these prior neuroimaging studies of inhibitory devaluation
and Uncanny Valley eﬀects certainly does support a call for
future studies to directly examine speciﬁc issues regarding the
extent to which the Uncanny Valley eﬀect reﬂects inhibitory
devaluation of stimuli that activate multiple, competing stimulus
representations.
For example, tasks that involve cognitive conﬂict are thought
to rely on the anterior cingulate cortex for conﬂict detection
(Botvinick et al., 2001; Kerns et al., 2004), while the lateral pre-
frontal regions appear to be recruited during subsequent cogni-
tive control (Carter and van Veen, 2007). This may explain why
tasks that evoke cognitive dissonance have been shown to engage
the dACC as well as the insula (van Veen et al., 2009) and left
dorsolateral PFC (Mengarelli et al., 2013), and why activation in
these areas has predicted attitude change in line with cognitive
dissonance theory. Indeed, more recent evidence (Izuma et al.,
2013) suggests that the same region of the dACC is involved
in both cognitive dissonance and conﬂict. Therefore, if the
Uncanny Valley eﬀect can be understood as the aﬀective conse-
quence of inhibition applied to reduce cognitive conﬂict, then
we might expect to see anterior cingulate involvement when
participants judge stimuli that present conﬂicting cues to cate-
gory membership. This can be assessed by combining Uncanny
Valley paradigms such as the paradigm used in our experiments
with techniques such as fMRI or EEG/ERP. Electrophysiological
markers of conﬂict detection, such as the N2 event-related poten-
tial obtained from frontocentral electrodes (directly above the
dACC), for example, may be particularly useful for examining the
link between conﬂict and stimulus devaluation in Uncanny Valley
paradigms.
One possibility would involve extending the approach used by
Kiss et al. (2008) in their EEG/ERP study of inhibitory devalu-
ation that focused on how changes in the amplitude of the N2
component were linked to the magnitude of stimulus devalu-
ation measured thereafter. Using this approach with Uncanny
Valley-type stimulus sets would likewise be expected to reveal the
largest N2 component, and the most negative aﬀective response,
for those stimuli that most strongly activate multiple, competing
stimulus interpretations. Experimental priming manipulations
might also be used to vary the extent to which a stimulus from
a given perceptual continuum would activate multiple, compet-
ing stimulus interpretations. For target images selected from the
midpoints of human-robot morph sequences, for example, vary-
ing whether a preceding prime image is either a human, robot,
or from a completely unrelated (control) category should have
an impact on behavioral and neuroimaging measures of cog-
nitive conﬂict, inhibition, and subjective emotional responses
to the target images. The anterior midcingulate cortex (aMCC)
has also been linked to cognitive control and negative aﬀect
(Shackman et al., 2011). Future fMRI investigations may there-
fore target the aMCC as another potential link between cognitive
conﬂict, the recruitment of cognitive inhibition and negative
aﬀect in situations involving the Uncanny Valley and other con-
ditions known to produce inhibitory devaluation.
Individual Differences
Another important avenue of research concerns indi-
vidual diﬀerences in inhibitory processes that might
explain diﬀering aﬀective responses to ‘uncanny’ stimuli.
In our experimental assessment of the feasibility of the
inhibitory-devaluation hypothesis (Experiments 1 and 2),
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we observed that, while the individual aﬀective responses of most
participants reﬂected an Uncanny Valley-like pattern of stimu-
lus evaluation, this was not universal. Individual diﬀerences in
aﬀective responses to uncanny stimuli could arise either due to
varying inhibitory control abilities, or due to variations in the
aﬀective sensitivity of an individual to an inhibitory signal. For
example,MacDorman and Entezari (2015) recently observed that
the eeriness induced by uncanny stimuli was more pronounced
among individuals with high trait anxiety. Given evidence that
trait-anxious persons exhibit hyper-responsivity in fronto-limbic
regions associated with negative aﬀect (Shin and Liberzon, 2009),
it is possible that their sensitivity to Uncanny stimuli arises due
to heightened aﬀective reactivity to inhibitory signals. Individual
diﬀerences in the magnitude of other forms of inhibitory-
devaluation have also been linked to diﬀerences in inhibitory
control (e.g., failures to inhibit motor-responses, Ferrey et al.,
2012). Exploring the relationship between individual diﬀerences
in the subjective magnitude of the Uncanny Valley eﬀect and
diﬀerences in inhibitory control and/or aﬀective sensitivity to
inhibitory signals may therefore provide another interesting
direction for future research into the speciﬁc sequence of cogni-
tive and aﬀective events that the inhibitory-devaluation account
of the Uncanny Valley is proposed to comprise.
Conclusion
The importance of elucidating speciﬁc mechanisms under-
lying the Uncanny Valley eﬀect is underscored by the
extent to which interest in this eﬀect has spread from
robotics into other areas, such as computer graphics and
prosthetics (Seyama and Nagayama, 2007; MacDorman et al.,
2009; Mitchell et al., 2011; Tinwell et al., 2011; Poliakoﬀ et al.,
2013). Whereas many accounts of this eﬀect have focused on
the potential relationship between the subjective human-likeness
of a stimulus and an observer’s emotional response to it (e.g.,
MacDorman and Ishiguro, 2006; Seyama and Nagayama, 2007;
MacDorman et al., 2009), we propose an alternate account based
on the novel hypothesis that the Uncanny Valley is not directly
related to ‘human-likeness’ per se, but instead reﬂects a more gen-
eral form of stimulus devaluation that occurs when inhibition is
triggered to resolve conﬂict between competing stimulus-related
representations. Our preliminary assessment, both in terms of
prior ﬁndings as well as through our experimental tests of two
speciﬁc predictions arising from this new account of the Uncanny
Valley, establish its feasibility and make clear the need for addi-
tional research into the possibility that the strong dislike of
Uncanny-type stimuli reﬂects the negative aﬀective consequences
of conﬂict-resolving inhibition.
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